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Abstract
This article analyzes the potential for institutional design to depoliticize macroeconomic 
policy-making by examining currency board arrangements. It develops a novel argument to 
understand the effects of institutional design based on institutional complementarities. This 
argument highlights that the functioning of a given institution is conditioned by the broader 
institutional context. The article contrasts this framework with two common approaches –
here termed the institutional design and the epiphenomenalism views – and argues that the 
centrality of institutional complementarities can account for the mixed record of currency 
boards. The most important complementarities of a currency board are with fiscal, labor 
market and informal institutions, which are important prerequisites for successful currency 
boards. By drawing on recent advances in the study of depoliticization, we show how these 
institutions contribute to governmental, societal and discursive depoliticization. This 
argument is evaluated by examining three case studies of currency boards – Argentina, 
Estonia and Lithuania. The article also explores some broader implications of this analysis for 
understanding the depoliticization of economic policy. 
                                                            
1 Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association in Washington, DC, August 28-31, 2014 and at the 22nd International Conference of Europeanists, 
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Introduction
One of the key concerns in both scholarly and policy debates about economic policy relates 
to the role of institutions in preventing macroeconomic instability. There has been extensive 
research by economists and political scientists on the role of institutional design in both 
developed and developing countries. Much of this debate has revolved around central bank 
independence as a way of depoliticizing monetary policy and eliminating time inconsistency 
problems (Persson and Tabellini 1993). 
By contrast, this article focuses on currency boards, a particular form of fixed 
exchange rate regime, in which money in circulation is fully backed by the central bank’s 
foreign currency reserves.2 Currency boards were at one point quite common, especially in 
British colonies in the early 20th century. As colonies gained independence, they generally
moved away from such monetary policy arrangements. More recently, currency boards have 
experienced a renaissance of sorts. After Hong Kong reinstated its currency board in 1983 
following almost a decade under a more flexible exchange rate regime, a number of countries 
also introduced them – Argentina (1991), Estonia (1992), Lithuania (1994), Bulgaria (1997), 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1997), adding to a list which also includes some long-standing currency 
boards, including Brunei, Bermuda and the Faroe Islands (Williamson 1995). 
In light of various developing country financial crises, there has been growing interest 
in currency boards as a particularly hard peg. Along with dollarization and currency unions,
currency boards are seen to constitute one of the ‘corner solutions’ that, unlike ordinary fixed 
exchange rate regimes, could be expected to withstand speculative attacks on global financial 
markets (Fischer 2001). Currency boards remain controversial, and this controversy is largely 
bound up with different theoretical perspectives on institutions. 
This article contrasts two broad approaches to economic institutions, here labelled the 
‘institutional design’ and ‘epiphenomenalism’ views, with an alternative framework based on 
institutionalist scholarship. We integrate insights from institutionalist scholarship to make 
four contributions. 
First, we develop a more nuanced account of currency board regimes and their 
sustainability. By drawing on recent institutionalist scholarship, we argue that institutional 
complementarities can explain why the effects of currency boards are not uniform. In 
particular, we argue that the sustainability of a currency board cannot be taken for granted. 
We suggest that other institutions condition the effects of currency boards. If complementary 
institutions exist, then the currency board is likely to be stable and perform well. However, if 
                                                            
2 Strict adherence to currency board criteria would rule out conventional central banking and any attempts by the 
monetary authority to engage in sterilization or other form of intervention in financial markets. Since none of 
the modern currency boards have fully respected these restrictions, Hanke (2002) prefers to refer to them as 
currency board-like regimes. This paper follows conventional practice and simply uses the term currency board 
(Williamson 1995).
the broader institutional framework is not complementary, then a currency board will not be 
sustainable.
Second, our case studies shed light on the determinants of such complementarities. 
This is potentially quite significant, given that the sustainability of currency boards may 
depend on them. Critics of existing scholarship on institutional complementarities have 
argued that their political underpinnings are underspecified or based on functionalist 
assumptions (Streeck 2005). Unless a currency board is introduced in an economy that 
already has complementary institutions, it could still be successful, provided that the currency 
board can become an anchor or focal point stimulating the subsequent development of 
complementary institutions, e.g. in a newly independent country without well-established 
institutions, like Estonia. 
Third, based on this analysis of institutional complementarities and currency boards, 
we reflect on the scope for institutional design to bring about depoliticization of economic 
policy, by removing a policy area from the remit of political contestation. Here we draw on 
recent debates about the need to broaden the concept of depoliticization beyond state-centric 
approaches and consider societal and discursive dimensions (Wood and Flinders 2014).
While this research has highlighted the importance of interactions between different forms of 
depoliticization, our article suggests that such interactions can be understood as a form of 
institutional complementarities.
Finally, we reflect on the lessons of this analysis for understanding the relationship of 
successful currency boards to economic crises. Our article implies that this relationship is 
complex. On the one hand, economic success in terms of growth and low inflation increases 
the support for currency boards. To some extent fiscal prudence and the accumulation of 
surpluses in good times may also enhance the authorities' ability to withstand crises. On the 
other hand, we note that even successful currency boards with highly complementary 
institutions and a strong commitment to fiscal prudence, like that in Estonia, may experience 
deep recessions, in part because the very success of the currency board may contribute to 
excessive optimism, credit growth and higher private borrowing. Most importantly, for the 
currency board to withstand a severe crisis, complementary institutions and an exceptionally 
strong political commitment to the currency board are essential, as it is under such 
circumstances that sustainability is most severely tested. 
In the following section, we introduce the theoretical debate. After that we analyze the 
currency boards in Argentina, Estonia and Lithuania and examine the role of complementary 
institutions in contributing to their sustainability. The conclusion identifies some general
lessons for the debate about institutional design, institutional complementarities, currency 
boards and depoliticization.
Institutions, currency boards and depoliticization of economic policy
Most advocates of currency boards, especially in economics, subscribe to what we call an 
‘institutional design’ perspective. According to this perspective, policy makers can craft 
institutions, and assuming that they are carefully designed and the associated rules are 
followed, they can be expected to deliver good results. The introduction of central bank 
independence is an example of institutional design that is expected to lead to lower inflation 
(Persson and Tabellini 1993; Alesina and Summers 1993). However, other kinds of 
institutional design, such as the adoption of fixed exchange rate regimes, have also received 
attention and been quite common, both in Europe and in emerging markets (Uribe 1997; 
Schamis and Way 2003). 
From the institutional design perspective currency boards represent a superior way of 
depoliticizing monetary policy, reining in fiscal policy and ensuring macroeconomic stability
(Hanke 2002). According to Hanke (2002), the currency boards that have failed have fallen 
short because the principles of genuine currency boards were not implemented. More 
generally, this perspective relates to debates about depoliticization, which have been 
increasingly influential in recent years as governments have sought to overcome time 
inconsistency and other regulatory problems by designing institutions that minimize the 
scope for political influence and contestation in various policy spheres (Flinders and Buller 
2006).
By contrast, sceptics tend to view currency boards as epiphenomenal, as any good 
outcomes associated with currency boards reflect other underlying factors (Roubini 1998). In 
other words, if institutions are endogenous and reflect other factors, such as the interests of 
the powerful, then they may not have any independent causal effect of their own (Przeworski 
2004, 166), in much the same way as many realists in international relations theory perceive 
institutions (see Mearsheimer 1994). If there is a correlation between currency boards and 
good macroeconomic outcomes, then this is because a strong preference for macroeconomic 
stability induces both the adoption of the currency board and good economic outcomes – and 
these factors would be likely to produce good macroeconomic outcomes even without a 
currency board (Roubini 1998; see Posen 1998 for a similar argument about central bank 
independence). 
We suggest that neither of these two perspectives can account for the empirical record 
of currency boards. The epiphenomenalism view cannot fully account for the robust 
relationship between the introduction of currency boards and falling inflation (Wolf et al. 
2008), whereas the institutional design view cannot explain why some currency boards, like 
Argentina's, which were initially viewed as successful, ultimately collapsed or why countries 
like those in the Baltic states, which were strongly committed to currency boards, 
experienced some of the deepest recessions in the world in 2008-9. This also reinforces the 
need to understand the factors contributing to the sustainability of institutions.
This article seeks to reconcile the contradictory experiences of currency boards by 
developing an alternative approach that draws on the insights of institutionalist scholarship. 
Institutionalists define institutions as ‘humanly devised rules and procedures—both formal 
and informal—that constrain and enable political behavior’ (Levitsky and Murillo 2004, 
117). Building on Hall and Thelen (2009) and others, we also see institutional continuity and 
change as a political problem, i.e. something that cannot be taken for granted, but which has 
to be actively created and maintained by political actors, especially in times of economic 
crises. 
This article focuses specifically on the importance of institutional complementarities, 
which imply that the ‘functional performance of an institution A is conditioned by the 
presence of another institution B, and vice versa.’ (Höpner 2005, 383; see also Aoki 1994 and 
2001). If such institutional complementarities are important, then the functioning of currency 
boards cannot be assessed in the abstract without considering other related institutions. 
Institutionalist scholars have shown that institutional complementarities are important in 
various fields of the political economy, e.g. the complementarity of corporate governance and 
industrial relations (Höpner 2005) and of central bank institutions and labor market 
institutions (Iversen 1999; Soskice and Iversen 2000). This idea is also one of the central 
building blocks of the Varieties of Capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice 2001). More 
recently, research in a similar vein has considered the differential effects of currency unions 
on countries with different types of labor market institutions. Such research has compared 
Northern and Southern Eurozone members (such as Germany and Greece), and shown that 
the institutional context in Germany is very well suited to the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), whereas the Greek economy fares less well, given that it lacks coordinated wage-
setting institutions and has traditionally been more reliant on devaluations to restore 
competitiveness (Hancké 2013; Hall 2014). Since many policies are endogenous to various 
institutions and their desirability is context-dependent, the institutional environment is very 
important.
We consider three kinds of institutions, corresponding to the three forms of 
depoliticization identified by Wood and Flinders (2014): governmental, societal and 
discursive depoliticization. First, as a form of governmental depoliticization, i.e. the design of 
government institutions to minimize political contestation, we consider fiscal institutions. 
There is a consensus in the literature that fiscal policy plays an important role under a 
currency board (Wolf et al. 2008; Williamson 1995). High deficits may lead to a depletion of 
foreign currency reserves, which could ultimately undermine the currency board regime. 
Similarly, fiscal surpluses in good times are an important prerequisite for responding to 
economic downturns, as activist monetary policy cannot be used under a currency board. The 
literature on fiscal policy has demonstrated that fiscal institutions are important determinants 
of fiscal policy outcomes. Based on the existing literature we expect the centralization of 
fiscal policy making, budgeting procedures and the degree to which sub-national 
governments face hard budget constraints to have an important impact on deficits and to 
make the sustainability of currency boards more likely (Eslava 2006). 
Second, we also consider societal depoliticization, i.e. the degree to which there is 
public debate on a given issue. Here civic engagement and the structure of civil society are 
particularly important, given that this is generally the foundation of public engagement and 
active debate about policy (Wood and Flinders 2014, 159). In this context, we examine labor 
market institutions, as trade unions are among the most important civil society organizations 
that seek to influence economic policy. Much of the literature on currency boards and 
currency unions has focused on the importance of labor market flexibility, especially during 
economic downturns, since the currency board regime precludes competitiveness restoration 
with nominal exchange rate depreciation. However, labor market institutions also shape the 
sustainability of currency boards in other ways. Most importantly, organized labor may act as 
a veto player for economic policy or help repoliticize economic policy-making, for example, 
by arguing for a broader remit of economic policy. We also consider constitutional 
arrangements, including the federal/unitary structure of countries, as they are also likely to 
affect the representation of cleavages and the degree of policy contestation (Tsebelis 1995). 
This literature also includes studies of electoral systems, which shape the representation of 
specific interests and the number of veto players (Persson and Tabellini 2004). We pay less 
attention to this factor, given that there is limited variation across our cases with respect to 
this variable. While Lithuania has a mixed system, all the cases considered here have 
considerable elements of proportional representation in national legislative elections.
Third, we also consider discursive depoliticization, ‘when the debate surrounding an 
issue becomes technocratic, managerial, or disciplined towards a single goal’ (Wood and 
Flinders 2014, 161). Such dominant understandings manifest themselves as informal 
institutions or norms, which constrain behavior and shape preferences by means of a logic of 
appropriateness (March and Olsen 2006). We explore whether there is any evidence of
informal norms strengthening these currency boards. We expect high legitimacy and taken-
for-grantedness to contribute to the sustainability of currency boards. By contrast, 
contestation surrounding economic policy or lack of confidence in formal institutions may 
make currency boards harder to sustain (Levitsky and Murillo 2004).
In addition, these case studies explore the determinants of institutional 
complementarities. As part of the debate surrounding dollarization and the validity of the 
optimum currency area criteria, some observers have argued that it would be dangerous to 
enter a currency union if all of the criteria were not fully satisfied. By contrast, others have 
argued that there could be an element of endogeneity and that once the new currency was in 
existence, the relevant institutions, trade flows and business cycles would adjust (for an 
overview, see Eichengreen 2002; de Grauwe 2000). As it is generally acknowledged that 
institutional complementarities do not result from deliberate grand designs (Thelen 2004,
285), this article explores under what circumstances such complementarities may emerge, 
even if they do not exist when the currency board is introduced.
Case selection
This article adopts a comparative case study design to the study of currency boards. Case 
studies are a very useful approach to this kind of research, as they allow us to analyze 
institutions and related causal mechanisms in great detail (George and Bennett 2005). Our 
case selection is based on the ‘diverse case method’, which ‘requires the selection of a set of 
cases—at minimum, two—which are intended to represent the full range of values 
characterizing X, Y, or some particular X/Y relationship’. (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 
300). By examining three currency boards, Argentina, Estonia and Lithuania, we are able to 
analyze the role of complementary institutions in reinforcing or weakening the currency 
board.
All of these currency boards were introduced to facilitate stabilization. Argentina had 
a long history of high inflation, and there were several failed stabilization attempts in the 
1980s. Partly harking back to a previous era of prosperity when there was also a currency 
board (1899-1929), Argentina introduced a currency board in 1991 to bring down inflation.
While it was initially perceived to be very successful, the Argentine case also represents the 
most famous example of a currency board’s collapse, as it unraveled in 2001-2.
Estonia and Lithuania regained their independence from the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s and introduced currency boards in the midst of a dramatic transition from central 
planning to market economies. Estonia introduced the currency board along with the new 
national currency, the kroon, in 1992, and Lithuania introduced its currency board about two 
years later. These two countries maintained their currency boards for about twenty years until 
adopting the euro in 2011 and 2015 respectively. 
This article demonstrates that the three currency boards considered here vary with 
respect to the nature of complementary institutions that emerged over time, with 
complementarity ranging from high (Estonia), intermediate (Lithuania) to low (Argentina)
(see Table 1 for an overview of key patterns). We demonstrate how these complementarities 
affected the viability of the currency board regimes in these three countries.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Argentina
For a number of years after its adoption, the Argentine currency board was viewed as very 
successful in taming inflation, restoring macroeconomic stability and ensuring robust growth, 
and the IMF characterized Argentina as a great success story. Argentina’s quick rebound 
from the ‘Tequila’ shock of 1995 also added to the currency board’s popularity (Wolf 2008, 
122). Concerns about financial stability after that crisis also contributed to reform of the 
financial system, which arguably became increasingly compatible with the currency board, 
and the privatization, consolidation and internationalization reforms in the second half of the 
1990s were widely viewed as successful (De la Torre, Yeyati, and Schmukler 2003, 49). 
We argue that the ultimate collapse of the currency board demonstrates that Argentina 
is a good example of a political economy without key institutional complementarities 
necessary to underpin it. In particular, although the central government did attempt to contain 
public spending, especially during the final years of the currency board regime, fiscal 
profligacy ultimately undermined the currency board regime. In contrast to Estonia, 
Argentina on average ran a sizeable public deficit during the years of the currency board’s 
operation despite high economic growth rates throughout most of the 1990s (see Table 1). On 
this dimension, Argentina is similar to Lithuania. As demonstrated in Table 1, the average 
public deficit was even higher in Lithuania, but as discussed below, the main difference 
between these two countries pertains to Lithuania’s greater ability to adjust during economic 
crises.
Although federalism is sometimes ‘market-preserving’ and may contribute to fiscal 
prudence and generate smaller deficits (Rodden and Wibbels 2002; Weingast 1995), in 
Argentina’s federal system the principle of revenue sharing exacerbated common pool 
problems in fiscal policy, not least given persistent inter-regional conflicts. This made it 
difficult to impose hard budget constraints on provincial governments, as the central 
government had to finance some provincial spending  (Blustein 2005, 47-53; Rodden and 
Wibbels 2002, 504). The Minister of the Economy Domingo Cavallo (2002) recounts in 
detail how problems in sharing the fiscal burden during the crisis of 1998-2002 contributed to 
the downfall of the currency board regime. There have been frequent attempts to reform 
fiscal policy institutions. Tax legislation was enacted or modified over 80 times in the period 
1988-2008, but the political integration of national parties fell, thereby increasing the 
importance of sub-national leaders and weakening the central government’s ability to enforce 
budget balance (Bonvecchi 2010, 2). 
Another reason why the currency board arrangement proved hard to sustain was its 
lack of compatibility with Argentine labor markets. Labor market regulations had remained 
rather rigid despite several steps towards increasing flexibility in the first half of 1990s 
(Patroni 2001). Organized labor has been an important political actor, in part given the close 
ties to the Peronist Justicialist party (PJ), an important force in Argentine politics. Strong 
mobilization by organized labor as a key social actor has often served as a veto point in 
Argentine politics and contributed to its ‘conflict society’, as well as growing unrest and
resistance to the currency board during the deepening economic crisis after 1999 (Baer et al. 
2002). 
Informal norms were not conducive to the sustainability of the currency board. Key 
principles of conomic policy, including the appropriate emphasis on macroeconomic stability, 
have been controversial in Argentina, and the traditional strength of developmentalist and 
heterodox ideas can explain the lack of a strong consensus on economic norms underpinning 
the currency board (Sikkink 1988, Neiburg 2006). As noted above, the failure of the 
stabilization programs in the 1980s also illustrate a tradition of unsuccessful macroeconomic 
reform strategies and reversals. More generally, Argentina is widely perceived as 
characterized by institutional weakness. Although lifetime tenure of Supreme Court justices 
has been enshrined in the constitution since 1853, practically all Argentine (democratic and 
non-democratic) governments have packed the court with preferred appointees (Levitsky and 
Murillo 2004, 116). Such factors are likely to have weakened the prospects for the 
sustainability of any formal institutions, including macroeconomic institutions, like the 
currency board.
The initial success of the currency board regime and the stability of the financial 
sector also had complex effects. It encouraged extensive borrowing in foreign currency (in 
US dollars in Argentina’s case). In the short term this strengthened the currency board, by 
increasing domestic demand and growth and by creating powerful constituents for preserving 
the peg as devaluation would have immediately increased the real value of debt (Woodruff 
2005). However, the perceived success of financial reform and of the currency board regime 
itself grew into over-optimism. Enthusiastic assessments by the IMF and American financial 
institutions tended to discount the risks of adverse developments and boosted lending to 
Argentina (Blustein 2005). This led to considerable increases in both private and public debt, 
which ultimately contributed to undermining the currency board itself (Wolf et al. 2008, 139).
These problems and the consequences of the lack of institutional complementarities
became increasingly obvious as Argentina was hit by crisis after 1999. Given that fiscal 
policy had been loose during the 1990s, the government had to borrow money to service the 
existing debt, and there was no scope for countercyclical spending in the depth of the 
recession. In light of the common pool problems discussed above, it was very difficult to 
constrain fiscal spending and to agree how to distribute the costs of very substantial 
adjustment between the central government and the provinces. The relatively rigid labor 
markets also increased the costs of adjustment in terms of unemployment. Many business 
groups started showing dissatisfaction with the currency board regime (Steinberg 2008, 27-
30). Exporters and import-competers revealed their frustration with lack of competitiveness, 
while non-tradable representatives were unhappy because of contracting domestic demand 
and deflation. Only the banking sector remained unequivocally in support of the currency 
board regime (Steinberg 2008, 27). 
Therefore, the Argentine experience illustrates the hazards of introducing a currency 
board into a political economy without complementary institutions. While the government 
was hoping that the currency board might contribute to fiscal prudence and contain debt, the 
most important lesson from the Argentine case is that institutional complementarities cannot 
be created simply by introducing a currency board. If the root cause of inflation is fiscal 
profligacy and common pool problems in taxation and spending, then credible fiscal reform is 
necessary to address this problem. If this does not materialize, then a currency board can be 
self-defeating, not least by inducing a false sense of security and facilitating more borrowing
to address competing claims in society (Baer et al. 2002), while the lack of complementary 
institutions means that the currency board could not be maintained during the crisis.
Estonia
The Estonian experience differs from Argentina’s in several respects. Given that Estonia was 
undergoing an economic transformation when the currency board was introduced, the country 
did not have any well-established complementary economic institutions. However, highly 
complementary institutions subsequently emerged, and this underpinned the commitment to 
the currency board and fiscal prudence for the duration of the currency board.
Although there has been some variation over time (including some loosening during 
the boom years), Estonia has had one of the most prudent fiscal regimes in Europe since the 
early 1990s. There were budget surpluses during nine of the eighteen years that the currency 
board was in existence (Feldmann 2013, 357; see also Table 1). As a result, Estonia has the 
lowest consolidated debt-to-GDP ratio in the European Union, which stood at 10% in 2013, 
well below the EU average of 87.1%.
This is largely attributable to complementarities with key fiscal institutions. Estonian 
fiscal policy-making is highly centralized. Budget commitments are generally agreed by the 
cabinet as a whole (Raudla 2013). The cabinet has also been able to bypass parliament on 
some issues, e.g. by deciding not to incur some agreed expenditures at the implementation 
stage (Raudla 2013). Article 116 of the Estonian Constitution, which states that any public 
spending needs to be financed by corresponding revenues, is sometimes described as a 
balanced budget requirement, but it is more accurate to see it as a quasi-constitutional norm 
that politicians have felt obliged to respect (see Raudla and Kattel 2011). In comparative 
terms policy-making is also facilitated by the fact that Estonia has a very small unitary state 
with relatively few veto players in policy-making, and local governments face hard budget 
constraints. More recently, and especially during the economic crisis in 2008-9, the 
institutional complementarities were important factors contributing to the maintenance of the 
currency board despite a deep economic crisis. The centralized fiscal policy institutions and 
relatively flexible labor markets facilitated the strategy of internal devaluation. 
It is also likely that the widespread awareness that large fiscal deficits might 
undermine the currency board has moderated pressures for increases in public spending. 
There is some evidence to suggest that the early introduction of the currency board had direct 
effects on fiscal institutions. For example, Raudla (2010, 473) shows that the constraints 
imposed by the currency board influenced the design of budgeting procedures from the early 
1990s, which have gradually developed into a fiscal contracts model of centralized fiscal 
policy-making. This is significant given that Estonia has had multi-party coalition 
governments and a fragmented party system since the first parliamentary election in 1992 
(largely as a result of its proportional representation electoral system), which could have been 
expected to make it harder to achieve fiscal consolidation and balanced budgets (Eslava 
2006).
Another important complementarity relates to labor market institutions. The Estonian 
labor markets are comparatively flexible, which has made wage adjustments in response to 
shocks somewhat easier in Estonia than elsewhere in Europe (Dabušinskas and Rõõm 2011). 
This has also strengthened the belief of Estonian experts in the feasibility of internal 
devaluation, i.e. adjustment without a devaluation of the exchange rate, even as foreign 
experts were skeptical or cautioned against it (Feldmann 2013). Labor market flexibility has 
also been reinforced by the political weakness of organized labor. Estonian trade unions have 
very low levels of membership (see Table 1), and to the extent that they have disagreed with 
government policy, they have not generally been able to mount any significant challenges to 
it. 
The currency board was also underpinned by informal institutions and norms. The 
endorsement of the currency board arguably goes beyond economic outcomes and includes a 
symbolic dimension, as the kroon increasingly came to be seen as a symbol of Estonian 
independence and successful economic reforms and growth (Feldmann 2008; Lauristin and 
Vihalemm 1997). Tellingly, a businessman who was advocating currency devaluation during 
the last economic crisis stated that ‘Estonian kroon must be untied from national flag, the 
national anthem and the coat of arms, and it should be viewed as a financial instrument – or 
we will end with bankruptcy’ (Tere 2012). This strong symbolic commitment to the currency 
board meant that it also enjoyed widespread popular support. Most Estonians associated the 
currency board with successful disinflation and the stabilization of the currency in the 1990s, 
thereby contributing to discursive depoliticization (Wood and Flinders, 2014).While the logic 
of the currency board was initially poorly understood even by economists, and many 
politicians and members of the public were skeptical or even opposed to it (Hansson 1994), 
the expert community and general public gradually came to support the peg with only minor 
exceptions (e.g., Kattel 2009). This commitment was largely maintained during the financial 
crisis of 2008-9 and has effectively been embraced both by the political right – which has 
been a dominant force in Estonian politics – and the political left. When there have been 
disagreements about fiscal policy, as between the center-right Reform and Fatherland-Res 
Publica Parties on the one hand and the center-left Social Democrats on the other in the 
summer of 2009, these have tended to revolve around the composition of fiscal spending or 
around the level or progressivity of taxation, not around the principle of balanced budgets per 
se. There have not been any significant political or popular challenges to these policies, and 
this was also true during the most recent economic crisis protests in Estonia were very 
limited, even compared to other countries in the region, such as neighboring Latvia 
(Beissinger and Sasse 2014).
How did such norms take hold? In part, this relates to the fall in inflation and 
resumption of growth in the 1990s and the perception of the currency board as an anchor of 
stability e.g. during the Russian crisis of 1998. The smallness and openness of the Estonian 
economy have also contributed to widespread support for stable exchange rates. Several 
factors could explain the support for the regime by sectors that theoretically might have 
opposed it. First, support for the currency board arrangement grew as a result of borrowing in 
foreign currency. For instance, the largest Estonian company Tallink, a logistics operator, had 
considerable loans in euros during the 2008-09 crisis (AS Tallink 2009, 3), as did many other 
businesses and households. Therefore, a stable exchange rate underpinned by the currency 
board was perceived as a way of avoiding difficulties of servicing these debts. Second, as in 
Lithuania, businesses appreciated macroeconomic stability and the overall very liberal 
economic regime, of which the currency board system was one of the chief anchors. Third, 
the strong ideational consensus in favor of the currency board discouraged opposition to it. 
Fourth, during the most recent crisis retention of the currency board was also bound up with 
the strategic objective of euro adoption, which was widely seen as important to consolidating 
Estonia’s position at the core of the EU and enhancing the county’s security (Feldmann 2013, 
365).  Finally, businesses found it relatively easy to adjust to competitiveness challenges 
because of the structural and institutional characteristics of Estonian economy and polity. As 
might be expected, the banking sector and the non-tradables sector – the traditional advocates 
of hard currency – have been unanimously in favor of the currency board system. It should 
also be noted that key characteristics of the financial sector were conducive to the operation 
of the currency board. While there was some turbulence in the Estonian banking sector in the 
1990s (most notably during the banking crisis in 1992 and to a smaller extent in conjunction 
with some bankruptcies in 1998), since the turn of the century the Estonian banking sector 
has been dominated by foreign ownership (99.2% of the banking sector was foreign-owned 
by 2005 (Darvas and Pisani-Ferry 2008, 2). For instance, during the last crisis in 2008-09, 
overall stability was bolstered by the fact that no bank rescue was needed (Epstein 2014), 
which reduced the pressure on public finances during the crisis. 
Lithuania
Lithuania's institutional framework could be classified as displaying intermediate levels of 
complementarity to the currency board compared to the other cases. As in Estonia, the 
currency board was introduced during the transition process that Lithuania was undergoing 
after regaining independence from the Soviet Union. While it did affect institutional 
development and acquire an important symbolic status, Lithuania did not develop equally 
complementary fiscal institutions; furthermore the consensus in favor of the currency board 
strengthened later than in Estonia. This may be related to the fact that Lithuania introduced 
the currency board later than Estonia, and therefore it may have played slightly less of a 
coordinating role for institutional development.
In contrast to Estonia, Lithuania has not displayed strong fiscal discipline, at least 
during times of economic growth (see Table 1). Fiscal policy was expansionary both before 
the Russian crisis and before the Great Recession. During the period of operation of the 
currency board, there was not a single year in which Lithuania had a budget surplus. 
As noted above, we classify Lithuania as displaying intermediate levels of 
complementarities in terms of fiscal institutions. On the one hand, Lithuania lagged behind 
Estonia and the Central and Eastern European average in terms of establishing budgetary 
rules conducive to fiscal discipline, as shown by Hallerberg and Yläoutinen (2010). 
Specifically, while Lithuania caught up with Estonia and regional average in terms of rules 
fostering the ‘delegation’ approach by early 2000s, it was still lagging regarding rules for the 
‘contracts’ approach in 2007 (the literature considers ‘contract’ rules to be more important for 
countries like Estonia and Lithuania which tend to have multi-party coalition governments
(Hallerberg and Yläoutinen 2010). Unlike Estonia, the norm of fiscal discipline did not 
emerge in Lithuania, as the considerable deficits during the boom years illustrate (see Table 
1). This was characteristic of governments with parties both on the political left and right. 
On the other hand, Lithuania's fiscal policy making is highly centralized, and there are 
few informal constraints. Therefore, Lithuania's majority governments have found it 
relatively easy to implement extensive fiscal policy adjustment during downturns, including 
both the 1998-1999 and especially the 2008-2010 crises when considerable fiscal 
consolidation packages were implemented. Overall, enforcement of the fiscal ‘leg’ of the 
currency board regime has been asymmetric: lack of enforcement during boom years (when 
constraints loosened) but very strict enforcement during crises. During economic downturns 
the preservation of the peg and the whole currency board system was one of the motivating 
factors for pursuing dramatic fiscal consolidation. This was especially evident during the 
crisis in 2008-2010. Political leaders publicly justified the need for fiscal consolidation by 
arguing that this was necessary to escape currency devaluation. Lithuania did not apply for 
official IMF assistance, and one of the reasons for this was the fear of the ‘Argentina 
scenario’ in reference to the neighboring Latvia where, as the then Deputy Chairman of 
Parliament’s Finance and Budget Committee claimed, the IMF had pressed for currency 
devaluation (Kaunodiena.lt 2008).
There is also some evidence that the currency board had an independent effect on 
fiscal policy in Lithuania (Kropas and Šidlauskas 2002, 71). During the early years of the 
currency board’s operation, there were attempts by the government to monetize deficits, but 
they were successfully resisted (Nausėda 2004). As early as 1997, Gitanas Nausėda, who was 
a high-ranking official at the central bank at the time, suggested politicians ‘forgot that the 
central bank can be forced to implement inflationary or deflationary monetary policy’
(Nausėda 1997, 9). Before the introduction of the currency board in 1994, the governor of the 
central bank was changed three times in less than four years. After the currency board was 
established, there were only two changes in twenty years. Monetary and currency policies 
gradually became stable and increasingly depoliticized in Lithuania, which suggests that the 
currency board did have some effect on institutional development. However, the currency 
board was also destabilizing in that it indirectly contributed to laxer fiscal constraints via its 
positive effects on confidence, interest rates, and the economic boom that ensued. As in 
Estonia, there was considerable overheating in the run-up to the global downturn of 2007-9.
Labor market institutions have been complementary to the currency board. The 
flexibility of the labor market has facilitated adjustment to shocks and the maintenance of the 
currency board regime. Lithuanian businesses have generally not expressed dissatisfaction 
with the currency board, which could partly be explained by the fact that they could increase 
competitiveness via other means, such as high wage flexibility (for which businesses were 
lobbying intensively) as well as lower tax rates. During the boom years and overvaluation 
periods, Lithuanian businesses oriented themselves towards the lucrative domestic market, 
and during downturns they were able to reorient towards external markets. This flexibility is 
also related to trade union weakness (see Table 1). The lack of enforcement of labor market 
regulations in Lithuania (as well as Estonia) also substantially increased the flexibility of the 
labor market (Eamets and Masso 2005). As there are no traditions of social pacts or wage 
coordination and trade unions are very weak, there are fewer constraints on policy and less 
contestation. 
In terms of informal institutions and norms, Lithuania can also be viewed as being in 
an intermediate position. Unlike Estonia, Lithuania did not develop any strong norm 
supporting fiscal surpluses, and there was great controversy surrounding the introduction of 
the currency board. There were also specific government proposals to abandon the currency 
board in the second half of the 1990s. On the other hand, the currency board regime has 
enjoyed great support at least since the early 2000s, and its introduction has been widely 
perceived as one of the most successful decisions during Lithuania’s recent economic history 
(Kuodis 2008, 10). The normative commitment to it was very strong by the time the last crisis 
struck in 2008-09, and hardly any analyst or economist mentioned the possibility of ending 
the currency board arrangement. Given that currency and monetary regimes were constructed 
during the transition period along with restoration of national state institutions, the currency 
board regime also became a powerful national symbol as in Estonia (Feldmann 2008) or a 
fact of economic life which was almost never questioned. For example, whenever anyone 
mentioned the possibility of abandoning the currency board regime during the economic 
crisis in 2008-10, they were considered incompetent or even unpatriotic. A prominent 
politician who discussed related issues publicly was subsequently ridiculed in the media and 
harshly criticized by the main political parties (Klaipėda 2009), which indicates high 
discursive depoliticization of the currency board. Such a strong and unquestioning 
commitment to the currency board contributed to rendering the large adjustment program 
during the financial crisis of 2008-10 possible. As in the Estonian case, a devaluation or 
abandonment of the currency board might also have jeopardized the prospect of euro 
adoption, which successive governments were strongly committed to.
In addition to increasing support for the currency board, this success had 
contradictory effects. On the one hand, by promoting macroeconomic stability and higher 
confidence, it contributed to increasing indebtedness (private and public), which led to higher 
vulnerability and greater susceptibility to crises. On the other hand, borrowing in foreign 
currency created powerful lock-in effects via ensuring greater support for the peg. A variety 
of complementary institutions helped ensure the viability of the currency board and facilitate 
the dramatic adjustment policies that were needed to maintain it during economic downturns.
Conclusions
This paper has applied insights from institutionalist scholarship to the study of currency 
boards. While currency boards are not a panacea, they may foster macroeconomic stability 
and be strong institutions in many cases. Existing scholarship focusing on differences in the 
suitability and effects of currency boards across countries has tended to focus primarily on 
economic factors, such as the size of the economy, trade patterns and vulnerabilities to 
external and internal shocks (Williamson 1995), whereas this paper has put greater emphasis 
on the institutional prerequisites of currency boards and explored their sustainability and 
contributions to depoliticizing macroeconomic policy.
First, we have argued that currency boards cannot be assessed in the abstract and 
stressed the importance of complementary institutions to the stability of currency boards, 
notably fiscal, labor and informal institutions, such as norms. In the absence of such an 
institutional environment, currency boards are less likely to be maintained, as the Argentine 
experience illustrates. In Argentina common pool problems in fiscal policy helped undermine 
the currency board, and relatively rigid labor markets and distributional conflicts involving 
both organized labor and provinces meant that adjustment under the currency board was 
difficult, even when there was a strong political commitment by the central government. The 
key fiscal institutions we have stressed are centralized fiscal policy-making, limited veto-
players as well as specific fiscal rules, which have been present in Estonia in particular. The 
Lithuanian case has been in an intermediate position, in that centralized fiscal policy has been 
very responsive in times of crisis, but less so in boom times. In addition, we have suggested 
that informal institutions may also be complementary to a currency board, as a strong 
normative consensus of the kind found in Estonia and increasingly also in Lithuania 
strengthened it, by contributing to discursive depoliticization and making alternatives to the 
currency board almost unthinkable in these two countries. It is noteworthy that in many ways 
the Baltic situation during the downturn of 2008-10 was less favorable than the one in 
Argentina in 1998-2001; Estonia and Lithuania experienced faster and more dramatic falls in 
GDP and exports and arguably faced worse global economic conditions but, unlike 
Argentina, managed to keep their currency board regimes intact (Kuokštis 2013).
Second, the Baltic cases show that currency boards may be helpful, especially in new 
institutional environments that initially lack complementary institutions. The Estonian case 
suggests that establishing a currency board in a newly independent country can be successful, 
especially if the currency board becomes an anchor shaping the development of other 
institutions, including those related to fiscal policy. In Lithuania, the currency board was 
introduced later and did not lead to the adoption of equally tight fiscal policy, though it 
ultimately became an important anchor of economic policy. Both cases illustrate that a
currency board may serve as a focal point for institutional development and also be 
underpinned by norms, which may contribute to societal and even discursive depoliticization 
of the currency board and undermine challenges to it (see Raudla and Kattel 2011). 
Third, this analysis has potentially profound implications for debates surrounding 
institutional design to depoliticize economic policy-making. To the extent that the 
functioning of institutions depends on a web of complementarities, institutional design is 
unlikely to have the desired effect unless it also affects and reshapes complementary 
institutions. Estonia and Lithuania were newly independent and small unitary states with 
centralized policy-making, where the currency boards acquired a central status and influenced 
other socio-economic institutions. The Argentine case is a cautionary tale and demonstrates 
that this may not necessarily occur everywhere, especially if there is pervasive contestation 
over relative gains within society (Baer et al. 2002). Therefore, we are skeptical about the 
prospects of currency boards in many emerging market economies, like Russia and Indonesia
(Culp, Hanke, and Miller 1999). Our argument could extend to depoliticization in other areas 
of economic policy-making, such as regulatory or tax policy, where institutional 
complementarities may also be crucial to the sustainability and ultimately the success of 
institutional reforms.
Finally, we have also shown that currency boards are related to economic crises in 
complex ways. Successful currency boards have contradictory effects. On the one hand, 
successful disinflation, macroeconomic stabilization and maintenance of the currency board 
during a crisis help increase support for this kind of monetary policy regime. On the other 
hand, by tying the hands of policy-makers, successful currency boards enhance credibility 
and thus loosen constraints on fiscal policy, which can lead to the lack of fiscal discipline 
which it was designed to prevent in the first place. This can also fuel extensive private 
borrowing, as in Argentina, Lithuania and even in Estonia, where a financial crisis erupted in 
2008-9 despite sound public finances. Furthermore, currency boards tend to lead to real 
exchange rate appreciation, which causes both aggregate economic problems and potential 
political pressure from specific interest groups, especially if the overall institutional 
environment in the country precludes flexible adjustment. This means that even successful 
currency boards are not inoculated against crises, and the sustainability of a currency board in 
the face of a crisis cannot be taken for granted.
The broader policy implications of our analysis suggest that currency boards may 
sometimes be successful, but they are no panacea and involve considerable risks. Most 
importantly, the depoliticization of macroeconomic policy is only likely to be successful, if 
there are complementary institutions in place. If such complementary institutions do not exist 
when reforms are undertaken, their subsequent emergence cannot be taken for granted. Our 
article suggests that future research on institutional design should pay more attention to 
institutional complementarities and their development, including the politics of fiscal and 
labor market institutions, but also informal institutions and norms given the importance of the 
societal and discursive dimensions of depoliticization, which are likely to be underpinned by 
complex political processes. 
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Table 1. The currency boards in Estonia, Lithuania, and Argentina.
Argentina Estonia Lithuania
CB start/end 1991, March/
2002, January
1992, June 20/
2011, January 1 
[euro adoption]
1994, April 1/
2015, January 1 
[euro adoption]
Years of operation 11 19 21
Average annual real 
GDP growth, in 
percent











in percent of GDP
-2.4 0.2 -3.2















Min and max of 
annual current 








Average annual gross 
public debt, in 
percent of GDP
38.8 5.7 25.7
Max annual gross 
public debt, in 
percent of GDP






Union density rate, 
2001
42.0 13.5 (2002) 16.8








Sources: World Bank database; IMF World Economic outlook database; Wolf et al.; EBRD 
Transition Reports; ICTWSS (AIAS) database; authors’ analysis and calculations.
